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Between 1928 and 1960 U.S. cotton production witnessed a revolution with average 
yields increasing roughly threefold.  In addition, the average staple length of the U.S. 
crop increased significantly, reversing a long-run downward trend in cotton quality.  
Underlying these accomplishments were major innovations in cotton marketing, 
wholesale changes in the varieties grown, and the emergence of a vibrant commercial 
seed industry.  This paper analyzes the key institutional and scientific developments 
underlying this revolution in biological technologies, pointing to the importance of two 
government programs—the one-variety community crusade and the Smith-Doxey Act—
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HOG ROUND MARKETING, SEED QUALITY, AND GOVERNMENT 




During the twentieth century American cotton farming evolved from a backward 
sector to a highly productive industry. For the most part, the history of the 
modernization of the cotton industry has concentrated on mechanization and the end of 
sharecropping to the virtual exclusion of any serious analysis of the enormous advances 
in biological technologies.
2 This omission is surprising given the emphasis devoted to 
the role of improved varieties in generating productivity growth of other crops and other 
regions.  Most notable are the studies on the development and diffusion of hybrid corn.
3 
The lack of attention to new cotton varieties should not suggest that no change occurred. 
To the contrary, average U.S. cotton yields started their upward march at about the same 
time as the upturn in corn yields, and from 1928-32 to 1958-62 the rate of growth in 
cotton yields actually outpaced that of corn yields (see Figure 1). 
This paper analyzes the role of government policy and, in particular, the one-
variety improvement movement in promoting the diffusion of new, high-performing 
cottons.  The story of the development and diffusion of new cotton varieties is far more 
intriguing than the often-cited accounts of the introduction of hybrid corn, in part 
because cotton farming was one of the most backward sectors of American agriculture.  
The most distinguishing characteristic of the diffusion of new cottons was the role of 
government policy.  Once new varieties of corn became available, the story of diffusion 
was largely the result of the market interactions between individual farmers and private 
seed companies (apart from extension service educational campaigns).  By comparison, 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Julian Alston, Shelby Baker, Dick Bassett, Fred Bourland, J. Jerome Boyd, 
Peter Coclanis, Harry B. Collins, John Constantine, Tom Culp, Early C. Ewing, Jr., Susana Iranzo, Hal 
Lewis, Gary Libecap, Shelagh Mackay, C. W. Manning, Leslie Maulhardt, William Meredith, Robert 
Margo, Massimo Morelli, Larry Nelson, Carl Pray, Gene Seigler, Macon Steele, Nancy Virts, Henry 
Webb, and Gavin Wright for their comments and advice.  We also benefited from the comments of the 
seminar participants at the Triangle Economic History Workshop, the University of Mississippi, Harvard 
University, and the spring 2002 All UC Group in Economic History Conference at Scripts College.  Work 
on this article was facilitated by a fellowship granted by the International Centre for Economic Research 
(ICER) in Turin, Italy.   
2 Wright, Old South, pp. 226-38; Street, New Revolution; Day, “Economics” pp.427-49; Musoke and 
Olmstead, “Rise of the Cotton Industry,” pp. 385-412; Whatley, “Labor,” pp. 905-929.  The exceptions 
typically deal with the boll weevil.  Helms, “Revision and Revolution,” pp. 108-25; Osband, “Boll 
Weevil,” pp. 627-43. 
3 Griliches, “Hybrid Corn,” pp. 275-80.  Modern convention uses the term “cultivar” instead of the 
term “variety.”  Because most of the literature of the period under consideration predates this 
terminology, we use the term “variety” throughout.  
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the cotton industry was long plagued by chronic problems of market failure that dulled 
the incentives for both seed breeders and individual farmers.  To overcome negative 
externalities in production and a “lemons problem” in marketing, the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and state officials orchestrated a collective action 
campaign to create one-variety communities.  This movement played a key role in 
facilitating the adoption of the new biological technologies.  
 
YET ANOTHER BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY  
 
The 1921 USDA Yearbook is representative of an extensive literature bemoaning 
yet another burden of southern history:  “According to the testimony of the cotton trade 
in Europe as well as in the United States, the quality of the American cotton crop has 
deteriorated in recent decades.”
4  The available quantitative evidence on the decline in 
quality in fact supports this claim.  Table 1 collects data on the staple length of U.S. 
cotton by state circa 1880, 1913, and 1928-30.
5  In every state for which data are 
available, the staple length in either 1913 or 1928-30 was less than in 1880.  Based on 
the national weighted average, staple length fell by over 12 percent over the fifty years 
between 1880 and 1930.
6  
The consequences of the deterioration in quality were potentially very serious 
given rising competition from foreign cotton, rayon, and other synthetic fibers. 
 
                                                 
4 Doyle, Meloy, and Stine, “Cotton,” p. 400.  Also see Johnson, Cotton, pp. 53-54.  The 1866 Report 
of the Commissioner of Agriculture dates the problem to the war itself.  “The most serious difficulty 
encountered by cotton-growers, and particularly those who are engaging in such enterprises for the first 
time since the war, had been found to be poor seed.”  The report further noted that “for seven years little 
or no pains have been taken by any cotton-growers to perfect their seed.”  U.S. Commissioner of 
Agriculture, Report, p. 209. 
5 Cotton length was one of the most important factors in pricing cotton.  Cotton classers divided 
samples into 6 different color classes.  Within each color there were a range of grades.  For white cotton 
there were 9 specific grades that captured factors such as the existence of foreign matter, the cotton’s 
color quality, and “ginning preparation,” which included the roughness, nappiness, and stringiness of the 
fibers.  With modern high velocity testing equipment it is now possible to cheaply determine important 
characteristics (such as fiber strength) that previously were difficult to assess.  Cox, “Cotton,” pp. 320-23. 
6 Determining exactly how the market valued this decline is slightly more complicated.  The text 
table below shows how average prices over the 1928-30 period in ten central markets varied with staple 
length, taking 7/8s of an inch as the standard. (USDA, Agricultural Statistics 1936, p. 84). 
13/16"    7/8"  15/16  1"  1 1/16"    1 1/8"  1 3/16"  1 ¼" 
93    100 103 107 112   116 124 147   
Note the marginal value of increasing staple length was greater at the ends, especially at the high end, 
than at the middle of the distribution.  Due to these non-linearities, the market value of the decline in 
staple length over the 1880-1930 period was larger than a comparison of the prices of mean qualities 
would indicate.  
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The causes of quality decline were twofold.  First, the invasion of the boll weevil, 
beginning in 1892, led farmers throughout the cotton belt to discard late-maturing 
varieties that were most susceptible to the pest.  “In this way many excellent varieties of 
long-staple upland cotton and practically all of the better types of medium-staple were 
lost within a comparatively short time, to be replaced by the early, rapid-fruiting types 
brought in from the northern parts of the belt.”
7  But the boll weevil was only part of the 
problem.  As indicated in Table 1, staple length also declined between 1880 and 1913 in 
areas not yet hit by the weevil such as North Carolina.  Contemporaries noted that 
cotton culture was burdened by an interlocking set of production and marketing 
problems that both hampered the ability of and reduced the incentives for individual 
farmers to maintain and improve cotton quality.  Cotton production was plagued by a 
number of negative externalities that made it difficult to maintain the genetic purity of 
the seed supply.  These technical difficulties were exacerbated by post-Civil War 
institutional changes, in particular the break-up of the plantation units into small 
operations and the increased importance of public gins.  In addition, the prevalence of a 
form of pooling contract known as the hog round system muted price incentives to 
produce high-quality cotton.  A “vicious circle” thwarted efforts to improve the crop 
and reduced demand for quality seed.  This, in turn, reduced incentives for seed 
breeders to invest in R&D, further reinforcing the low-level equilibrium trap.
8 
On the production side, problems of maintaining purity arose because cotton is 
subject to cross-pollination.  The incidence of cross-pollination varies greatly depending 
on the variety, weather conditions, the distance between fields, and the population of 
insects (especially bumble bees).  When cotton was cultivated in small fields located 
near woodlands that provided habitat for feral bees—conditions common across much 
of the South in 1900—cross-pollination rates could easily exceed 40 percent.  But when 
it was grown in large mono-variety fields that were frequently sprayed with insecticides, 
as was common in the Mississippi Delta by the 1950s, the annual cross-pollination rates 
were likely less than a few percent.
9  The median rate of natural crossing between 
                                                 
7 Ware, “Plant,” p.661.   
8 Burges, “Break This Vicious Circle,” pp. 5, 6, and 29. 
9 Brown, Cotton, 1
st ed., pp. 165-66.  Cook describes several cases in which early efforts to grow 
Durango and Egyptian cottons in California failed because of cross-pollination with shorter-staple 
cottons.  Cook, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 10-11.   
Cross-pollination rates in today’s cotton are lower because the plants have evolved to self-pollinate 
after the increased use of pesticides led to the destruction of the pollinating insects.McGregor, “Insect,” 
pp. 171-90D; Simpson, Natural Cross-Pollination.  
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alternate rows reported in ten studies across the South over the 1903-50 period was 
between 8 and 9 percent.
10 
Maintaining pure seed lines became an increasingly serious problem after the 
Civil War with the emergence of public gins and changes in ginning technology.   
According to the USDA roughly 90 to 95 percent of the seed used to plant the U.S. 
cotton crop in the 1920s and early 1930s was mixed “gin-run” quality.
11  (Even when 
farmers purchased seed rather than used their home-grown product, the “outside” seed 
was often simply gin-run seed from other areas.)  Prior to 1850 the typical plantation gin 
was animal powered and processed only three to four bales per day of cotton grown in 
the gin’s immediate neighborhood.  With the spread of steam power and other important 
innovations, gin capacity increased and the supply area expanded.  The major 
breakthrough occurred in the mid-1880s with the invention by Robert Munger of 
“system ginning” that employed pneumatic and mechanical conveyance technologies 
and multiple stands of gin equipment.   This represented one of the major technological 
advances in the New South.   By 1900 the prototypical modern ginnery, containing four 
gins of seventy saws each, could process 40 to 60 bales of cotton per day and some were 
capable of handling 150 bales per day.  The new “system” gins were much more 
efficient than the older methods, but their complicated machinery and larger clientele 
led to the unintended consequence of substantially increasing the problem of seed 
mixing.
12 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that seed mixing in successive gin runs 
was a very serious problem (the smaller the runs the greater the problem).
13  F o r  
example, the USDA estimated that “seed from a farmer’s first bale at the gin contains 
26 percent of the seed from the preceding bale….”
14  Investigators reported cases of 
farmers receiving seed not only from the previous farmer to use the gin but those three 
or four turns earlier.  Given the practices of the day, gin operators were apt to 
indiscriminately return seed to farmers even if the growers requested their own seed.  
                                                 
10 Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 158. 
11 Doyle, “Multiplicity,” p. 108; Doyle: “Cotton,” p. 264 
12 Bennett, Saw and Toothed Cotton Ginning, pp. 7, 32; Aiken, “Evolution of Cotton Ginning,” pp. 
199-206;Roper, “Cotton Ginning” pp. 338-39.; Ballard and Doyle, “Cotton-Seed Mixing Increased by 
Modern Gin Equipment”,. 
13 U.S. Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering, Better Cottons, pp. 955-58; 
Doyle, Meloy and Stine, “Cotton,” p. 400.  According to Cook most farmers only brought one or two 
bales to the gin at a time, which magnified the problem of the intermingling of seed.  Cook, “One-Variety 
Cotton,” p. 13.  Cook, “Local Adjustment,” p. 41, thought that the two sources of contamination were 
roughly of equal importance.  
14 U.S. Congress, Hearings, 80
th Cong., 1
st Sess., Part 2, October 10, 1947, p. 957.   
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Thus, “the farmer as an individual finds himself practically powerless when he attempts 
to establish and maintain a pure stock of cotton.”
15   
In this environment new cotton varieties proliferated but soon lost their 
distinctive advantages under mass cultivation.  As Ware put it, a “very high percentage” 
of the varieties “come and go within a rather brief period.”
16  Almost every 
contemporary authority highlighted the rapid turnover in varieties under cultivation.  Of 
the 58 varieties reported in the Tenth Census (1880), “only 6 were commonly in 
cultivation in 1895,” and none were grown by the mid-1930s.  Of the 118 varieties 
Tracy listed in 1895, only 2 were still present in 1925; and of the 600 varieties Tyler 
enumerated in 1907, fewer than 25 were in existence in 1925 and “only 9 were 
cultivated extensively.”  The problem was that “much of the benefit gained by bringing 
in new varieties and by the excellent breeding work that was done by the Department of 
Agriculture, private breeders, and the State experiment stations, has been lost by the 
failure to perpetuate the best strains and varieties and to keep them free from admixture 
with inferior kinds.”
17   
There are numerous accounts of promising varieties being destroyed by cross-
pollination and mixing at the gin.  As a prominent example, in 1912 Roland M. Meade 
first selected a prized variety in fields around Clarkville, Texas.  This variety (Meade) 
had lint of over 1 1/2 inches and had black seeds that were practically devoid of fuzz.  
The seed was taken to the Sea Island areas of South Carolina, increased, and sold in that 
region.  There it produced a staple length averaging 1 5/8 inches and showed 
exceptional uniformity.  “Meade was on the way to becoming a striking success.  More 
than 10,000 acres were grown between 1920 and 1922, but mixing of seed and planting 
in close proximity to fuzzy-seeded upland varieties resulted in a rapid contamination in 
the stocks, the mixed fiber was rejected by the trade, and the variety was largely 
abandoned after 1925.”
18  Cross-pollination and the mixture of seed at the gin reduced 
the ability of farmers who used saved seed to cultivate high-yielding, high-quality 
varieties.
19  Purchasing commercial seed was an expensive proposition: data from the 
                                                 
15 Doyle, “Cotton,” p. 264.   
16 Ware, “Plant Breeding,” p. 712. 
17 Ware, “Plant Breeding,” p. 696. 
18 Ware, “Plant Breeding,” pp. 690-91.  The literature repeatedly emphasized that mills would prefer 
shorter but uniform fibers to fibers of different lengths.  
19  There are several forces affecting seed quality.  For example, if farmers chose their seed stock 
from a random sample from the gin, it would have the negative effect of selecting strains with high seed-
to-lint ratio.    
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early 1920s indicate that the commercial product cost 2.5 to 4 times as much as “gin-
run” seed, and that improved seed sold by breeders cost 6 to 8 times as much.
20   
Coupled with these production externalities were serious marketing 
imperfections.  According to the preponderance of testimony and in line with the 
observed pattern of falling staple lengths and stagnating yields, local markets in the 
South failed to provide sufficient rewards for producing higher quality cotton.
21  
Complaints about middlemen seem to be common to all agricultural commodities, but 
in this case, the criticisms went beyond the habitual grousing.  The cotton grading and 
marketing system in place at the turn of the century was one of the most complicated 
and controversial aspects of the whole cotton production process.
22  Accurately grading 
individual bales of cotton in local markets was prohibitively expensive, given the 
technology of the day.  The use of mixed or gin-run seed added complications because 
there would be “considerable variation in quality and length of lint” within a single bale, 
making a small sample drawn from the exterior less representative.
23  As a result the use 
of pooling contracts was widespread; cotton was generally sold in small local markets 
on the “hog-round” or “on point” system, meaning buyers graded a sample of bales and 
then paid one average price for all the cotton in that market.
24  The cotton would then be 
shipped to regional markets where highly trained specialists would grade a sample from 
each bale in special rooms with proper lighting, temperature, and humidity.  After 
grading the cotton would be assembled in larger running lots of roughly similar quality 
                                                 
20 The ordinary ratios are based on data for 1920-22 from USDA, “Cotton Seed,” pp. 49, 59.  The 
improved seed ratios are based on prices found in Coker’s Pedigreed Seed Company catalogs.  For 
examples see the price list dated February 1, 1918, inserted in Coker’s, Spring 1918, and the Coker’s, 
Spring 1927, pp. 14-29.  In 1927 new releases cost farmers about $3.00 a bushel of 30 pounds plus 
shipping charges.  In addition to the reasons offered above, southern poverty, tenancy, low investments in 
education and extension activities, and high interest rates may have discouraged investments in better 
seed.   
21 Cook, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 12, 36; Cook and Martin, Community, p. 4; Crawford, “Point 
Buying,” pp. 376-86. 
22 Virts, “Efficiency,” pp. 390-91. 
23 Darst, “Cotton-Seed,” pp. 190-91. 
24 “This [the hog-round] system did not provide for the paying of fair premiums for better cotton, 
prices being based on the average quality produced in each district, usually with no advantage to the 
farmers who planted better varieties.” Cook and Doyle, “One-Variety Community,” p. 132.  The practice 
of pooling cotton in local markets was not a short-lived phenomenon.  Elsewhere Cook noted that, “‘the 
practice is old and longstanding, so that nobody now alive can be blamed for starting it.”’ As quoted in 
Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 13.   
As is often true, the nomenclature used to describe the cotton market varies between authors.  For 
example, Garside used the term “hog-round” system to describe the practice of quoting a single, average 
price for a large number of bales and “on point” pricing for the practice of quoting a single price for all of 
the cotton in a given market on a given day.  Garside, Cotton, p. 179.  Others use “round lot” pricing to 
describe the first practice and “hog-round” pricing for the second.  Note that making an all-or-nothing 
offer to an individual seller to buy a number of bales at a price based on average quality can preserve 
quality incentives.   
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bales for sale to the cotton mills.  There was a regional division of labor among mills, 
with some demanding better grades of cotton and producing higher quality output than 
others.
25  Once a given mill had adjusted its machinery it required a uniform staple 
length to run efficiently.  A difference of 1/32 of an inch could be significant to mills.  
The workings of the hog-round system encouraged farmers to “free ride” by marketing 
lower quality cotton than their neighbors, and helps explain the rising importance of 
short-staple varieties such as “Half-and-Half.”  Ordinarily one would expect pooling 
contracts to break down, as individuals who produced higher-quality goods demanded a 
higher price.  As predicted, some plantation owners did sell directly in central markets 
where the crop could be graded separately.
26  But most tenants and small farm operators 
lacked the economies of scale, information, and perhaps savvy to mitigate the problem. 
Such farmers suffered from problems of unequal bargaining power and asymmetric 
information as they likely confronted only one or perhaps two buyers in local markets.  
For these reasons, most contemporary accounts argued that high-quality cotton varieties 
were being driven from the market, exactly as Akerlof’s “lemon model” would 
suggest.
27  
                                                 
25 Wright, Old South, pp. 133-35. 
26 Virts, “Efficiency,” pp. 390-93.  Nancy Virts argued that these general marketing problems help 
explain the persistence of the plantation system.  She noted that plantations on average produced higher 
quality cotton and that this could be due to their having economies of scale in marketing that allowed 
them to bypass local markets.  She does not test among other hypotheses such as that plantations occupied 
better land that was more suitable for producing longer staple varieties.  Although Virts accepted the 
argument that buyers in local markets generally offered one price for all, she did not emphasize the 
dynamic implications of this system on cotton quality.  Ibid., pp. 387-88.  In addition to Virts’s 
observations about cotton marketing, plantations also provided a form of vertical integration and scale 
economies that protected seed quality by reducing cross pollination and seed mixing problems.  For 
example, America’s largest plantation, Delta and Pine Land Company, generally grew only one 
commercial variety at a time.  When other varieties were grown commercially or as part of the seed-
breeding program, the company was meticulous in separating different varieties in the field and at the gin.  
For this reason, plantations represented a market solution to the externality problems, which begs the 
question why the land in plantations was declining.  Edmonds, “Around the Clock,” pp. 40-43, 80.   
Burges observed that only shipments of 100 bales or more could command special treatment with respect 
to quality.  Burges, “Break This Vicious Circle,” pp. 5, 6, 29 
27 Akerlof, “Market,” pp. 488-500.  
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TESTING FOR MARKET FAILURE 
 
Although the “lemons problem” is much discussed, important real-world 
examples are rare in the literature.  Thus the nearly unanimous testimony of cotton 
specialists asserting that grading and marketing problems seriously distorted production 
incentives should be of considerable interest.  The USDA and various state agencies 
conducted numerous detailed studies investigating the relationship between price and 
quality in local and regional markets across the South.  Studies of local markets in 
Arkansas (1913-16), North Carolina (1914-16), Texas (1926), Alabama (1926 and 
1927), and South Carolina (1925-27) all found prices varied little with quality.
28  The 
two most definitive studies on cotton pricing were published by the USDA in 1936 and 
1939.  Howell and Burgess (1936) monitored individual transactions in over 100 local 
markets between 1928 and 1933, and independently classed 300,000 bales of cotton.  
They compared the prices received in local markets for cotton of a given quality with 
those prevailing in central markets for the same quality on the same day.  (Neither 
buyers nor sellers in the local markets knew the results of Howell and Burgess’s 
classifications at the time of sale.)  The survey found that the local market price 
differentials for various staple lengths were far smaller than the differentials in the 
central markets (which better reflected the value cotton spinners placed on cotton).  As 
an example, the Howell and Burgess research team classified and recorded the prices of 
over 100,000 bales of Middling White cotton.  Panel 1 of Table 2 offers a summary 
measure of the price differentials by staple length prevailing in the local and central 
markets over the 1928-33 period.  “For the 5-year period, on an average, premiums for 
staples longer than 7/8 inch in local markets amounted to only 17 percent of those in 
central markets and varied from only 12 percent for 15/16-inch cotton to 34 percent for 1 
1/8-inch cotton.  At the other end of the spectrum, discounts for cotton shorter than 7/8 
inch in local markets amounted to only 6 percent of those quoted in central markets for 
cotton with a staple length of 13/16 inch.”
29   The summary conclusion is that the price 
signals given to farmers in local markets systematically failed to reflect the incentive 
structure being generated in central markets. 
                                                 
28 As reported in Howell and Burgess, Farm Prices, pp. 2-3. 
29 Ibid., p. 21.  
 
9
Farmers who sold short-staple cotton were vastly overpaid, and those who marketed longer 
staples were shortchanged.
30  
Howell and Watson’s (1939) study covering the 1933-36 period took the 
research a step further.
31  In addition to comparing local and central markets, they 
compared local markets offering impartial public classification services (PCS) with 
those lacking such services.
32  Panel 2 of Table 2 shows the differentials by staple 
length for bales sold in the two types of local markets compared with equal quality 
cotton sold on the same day in the central markets.  (Note that the timing of sales in the 
local markets with PCS and those without PCS differed, making it necessary to report 
two series for central market differentials.)  Howell and Watson found that the quality 
differentials in the central markets were more closely reflected in local markets with 
public classification services than in those without such services.
33  As an example, the 
local markets with public classers captured 56 percent of the central market premiums 
for cotton of 1 1/16 inch (relative to 7/8 inch) whereas markets without public classers 
captured only 30 percent.  Compared with the 1928-32 period, farmers selling in both 
types of markets were increasingly receiving greater quality differentials, especially at 
the higher end.
34 
Several natural experiments offer further evidence on the workings of local 
markets.  In 1923 the cotton farmers in the McKinney area of Collin County, Texas 
began the process of forming one-variety communities (see p. 9) to improve cotton 
quality and yields.  Buyers soon recognized that the McKinney market had better cotton 
and began to offer substantial premiums compared to prices offered in nearby markets. 
                                                 
30 Numerous critics asserted that local cotton graders systematically cheated small farmers.  This may 
have happened, but Howell and Burgess’s findings suggest that the misgrading at the local level hurt 
some farmers and helped others.  For a statement of the cheating hypothesis see the testimony of 
Representative Hampton P. Fulmer in U.S. Congress, Hearings, 67th Cong., 4
th Sess., Part 1, February 5, 
9, & 12, 1928, pp. 1-5. 
31 Howell and Watson, Cotton Prices, pp. 1-54. 
32 One might be concerned that the availability of these services are not random and thus the 
comparisons did not represent true natural experiments.  For example, more advanced areas might have 
more access to classification services, better markets before their spread, and higher overall quality.   
Internal evidence suggests that if anything the biases ran in the opposite direction.  Although the 
differentials were greater in markets with public classification services, average prices and quality were 
not higher than in markets without such services.  The availability of such services may have been too 
recent to have much effect on cotton improvement. 
33 They also found that price variability, conditional on quality, was lower in markets with public 
classification services. 
34The finding that cotton markets were improving over the interwar period is consistent with the 
informed observations of Alston Hill Garside, an economist at the New York Cotton Exchange.  Garside 
credited the advent of uniform federal grading standards with improving grading practices.  Garside, 
Cotton, pp. 176-84.  
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“Difficulty then arose because the higher prices at McKinney soon attracted farmers 
from other communities, who soon were hauling considerable quantities of inferior 
cotton to McKinney, in order to take advantage of the higher prices paid there. 
One farmer was known to have hauled 48 bales of cotton 150 miles by truck and to have 
sold it for $5 per bale net above what he was offered on his local market.”
35  A s  
outsiders began shipping to McKinney, its share of the region’s market to jump from 25 
percent in 1925 to 37 percent by 1928.  This behavior only made sense where the hog-
round system was being employed.  Predictably, the McKinney price fell and the one-
variety effort collapsed.
36 
Other areas had long held a reputation for producing quality cotton and 
traditionally received price premiums.  Some mills and even the Liverpool Market 
essentially “bought cotton on the basis of place of origin, as well as on grade and staple 
length.”
37  The appearance of trucks and good roads eroded these advantages.  As an 
example,  
Country buyers of cotton knew the value placed on the Hope, Arkansas warehouse tag.  
They went into the sand hill sections of South Arkansas, bought short cotton hog round, 
trucked it over the concrete highway to Hope, put a Hope compress tag on it, and 
shipped it as Hope cotton.…  When the spinner got hold of the cotton he had a real 
surprise coming.  It was not Hope cotton.  It was some inferior short stuff from the sand 
hill of South Arkansas.  So the premium went off Hope cotton.  Similar situations 
prevailed throughout the South.
38 
 
Collectively, these experiences with free riders dumping inferior cotton into 
quality markets, coupled with the exceptionally detailed and careful studies on local and 
central market pricing and grading practices, strongly support the assertions of 
contemporary cotton specialists.  The hog-round system was, indeed, widespread, and it 
resulted in a “lemons problem” that led to a decline in cotton quality.   
 
                                                 
35 Saunders, Pioneer, p. 7.   
36  Ibid., pp. 1-10.  The same general story was repeated across the South, as early one-variety 
community programs suffered because outsiders shipped in inferior cotton.  Coruthers refers to similar 
cases in North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Mississippi.  Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 39-55. 
37 Pike, “Cottonseed,” p. 2; Crawford, “Point Buying,” pp. 376-86. 
38 Andrews, “Cotton,” pp. 8-9; also see Garside, Cotton, p. 181.    
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THE ONE-VARIETY COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 
 
Early in the twentieth century USDA scientists intensified their breeding and 
extension projects aimed at improving the yields and quality of U.S. cotton.  Initially, 
these efforts paralleled similar campaigns for other crops.
39  Because of the  problems 
discussed above, researchers soon realized that it would not be sufficient to just develop 
and distribute small quantities of better seeds. Rather their campaign would have to 
change the complex institutional structure in order to reduce negative externalities and 
better align local prices with those in regional markets. According to the father of the 
one-variety community movement, O. F. Cook, “the method of distribution that was 
first projected did not result in establishing commercial supplies of pure seed.  Several 
of the varieties that were developed and distributed in the early years of the cotton-
breeding work were lost completely before the system of distribution was changed.”
40  
To counter these problems, Cook developed an ambitious program to develop better 
cotton varieties, improve cultural methods, standardize cotton classification systems, 
advance new seed treatment processes, and train cotton qualified graders.
41   
At the heart of the program was a utopian scheme to fundamentally change the 
way cotton was grown, ginned, graded, and marketed in the United States.  To succeed 
would require a “new association of ideas” to alter how farmers thought about their 
community.
42  Instead of each individual farmer choosing his own variety, the new 
system would be built on a cooperative structure in which cotton farmers would 
organize “one-variety communities.”  The USDA in conjunction with state authorities 
would provide education, guidance, and standardized contracts.  Cook and his fellow 
reformers envisioned communities ranging in size from a group of farmers using one 
gin to encompassing an entire state.  In addition to producing, ginning, and marketing 
only one variety of cotton, the communities would be responsible for increasing (and in 
some cases breeding) pure seed for their members. It is important to note that from the 
outset the literature on one-variety communities emphasized the benefits to the nearly 
                                                 
39 For an example of these efforts in the wheat industry see Olmstead and Rhode, “Red Queen,” pp. 
8-20. 
40 Cook, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 8.  
41 By the mid-1930s, the USDA had initiated genetic and breeding research programs in every 
important cotton producing state.  Ware, “Plant Breeding,” p. 665. 
42 Cook, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 33.  
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total exclusion of any discussion of the costs associated with individual farmers losing 
the freedom to tailor their cultural practices to fit their particular growing situations.
43   
  Cook first suggested the idea of one-variety communities in 1909 and 
subsequently developed the concept in an article published in 1911.
44  At first the 
USDA concentrated its one-variety campaign in the newly irrigated cotton regions in 
the Far West, promoting the idea in conjunction with the distribution of a number of 
recently introduced or developed long and medium staple varieties.  Often local USDA 
scientists withheld the distribution of the new seed until a one-variety structure was in 
place.  The first one-variety community began in 1912 with the distribution of Yuma 
cotton in the Salt River Valley of Arizona.
45  At about the same time Durango was 
grown in a single-variety community in the Imperial Valley of California.  After 1920 
Acala, which the USDA had introduced from Mexico in 1907, became an important 
one-variety cotton in many western areas.
46  The initial efforts were often loosely 
structured.  As an example, to gain access to Acala seed, growers in Riverside County 
organized the Acala Cotton Growers’ Association of the Coachella Valley in 1920.  By 
1923 the region’s farmers had voluntarily planted Acala on over 96 percent of their 
cotton acreage.  It was only after the fact, in order to prevent the mixing of seeds at gins 
and cross-pollination, that Riverside County gave legal protection to the district in 1924 
by passing an ordinance declaring the county a pure seed district.
47  These western 
initiatives, as well as scattered efforts in some southern states, generally met with mixed 
results as farmers and USDA officials experimented with varieties and structures.  Most 
one-variety districts reported higher yields and increased premiums, but for a number of 
reasons (including problems of free riding from nearby farmers and inadequate supplies 
of the one-variety seed to serve a given area) many of the early districts were short-
lived.
48 
                                                 
43 Even the few one-variety proponents who addressed this concern typically argued that under the 
prevailing adverse conditions each farmer stood to gain from adopting the community’s improved seed.  
Willis, One-Variety Cotton, pp. 3-4. 
44 Cook, “Cotton Improvement,” pp. 397-410; Cook, “Local Adjustment,” p. 41.  
45 The North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station began work on community production around 
1915, but it is not clear if any communities were actually formed at that time.  Coruthers, “One-Variety 
Cotton,” pp. 75.79. 
46 Ware, “Plant Breeding,” p. 697; after Acala was introduced it took researchers several years to 
select and develop outstanding strains suitable for commercial use.  Ibid., p. 689.  Durango was another 
recent Mexican introduction and Yuma and Pima were the product of USDA breeding programs in the 
Southwest and depended largely on the on crosses of Egyptian cultivars with Sea Island cotton. 
47 McKeever, “Community,” p. 29. 
48 For inadequate supplies of planting seed, see Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 112.  
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A giant step in the one-variety campaign occurred in May 1925 when California 
enacted legislation declaring eight San Joaquin Valley counties and Riverside County as 
a one-variety community.  The new law represented the culmination of an extended 
lobbying effort by W. B. Camp, the USDA’s California cotton specialist who had been 
sent west in 1917 to promote one-variety production of high-quality varieties.  The law, 
along with the institutional structure that evolved in 1926, would define the 
development of the state’s cotton industry for the next six decades.  The law stipulated 
that only Acala could be planted, harvested, or ginned in a district of well over four 
million acres.  Even the possession of non-Acala seeds was illegal (except at a few 
research stations).
49  The USDA’s Cotton Research Center at Shafter became the de 
facto sole Acala breeder in the state, as the USDA successfully strove to keep private 
seed breeders out of the Central Valley.  Under this system, Shafter’s “head breeder” 
held enormous power, overseeing a research program that for the next 60 years would 
be the only source for cottonseed for most of California. To increase and market the 
seed bred at Shafter, growers organized the California Planting Cotton Seed Distributors 
in 1926.  Most specialized accounts credit the one-variety system with contributing 
significantly to California’s high cotton yields, which over much of the twentieth 
century were roughly double the national average.  (In fact, many factors such as 
climate and irrigation contributed to the state’s yield advantage.)  These accounts also 
credit the one-variety community with helping California growers earn quality 
premiums for their relatively uniform, medium staple product.  
To date, neither the economics nor history literature has devoted much attention 
to the one-variety movement.  The one exception is John Constantine, Julian Alston, 
and Vincent Smith’s critical Journal of Political Economy article analyzing the 
California one-variety law.
50  They argued that in the 1970s and 1980s the legislation 
artificially limited California’s production, resulting in higher prices for the state’s 
cotton.
51  Landowners in regions most suitable for Acala production (the community 
variety) benefited, while other Central Valley farmers experienced yield losses or 
abandoned cotton.  Constantine, et al. concluded that the legislation became 
                                                 
49 In 1941 Riverside County dropped out of the program in order to grow longer staple Pima cotton, 
which fetched relatively high prices during World War II.  This move posed little threat to Acala growers, 
because of the physical separation between Riverside County and the San Joaquin Valley.   
50 Constantine, Alston, and Smith, “Economic Impacts,” pp. 951-74. 
51 It is important to emphasize that Constantine, Alston, and Smith argue that the technological 
regulation became increasingly costly as time passed and was clearly inefficient by the 1970’s.  They are 
agnostic as to whether or not the law was efficient in its early decades.     
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increasingly inefficient and by the late 1970s cost growers as a group about $180 
million annually (over 10 percent of the annual value of the state’s cotton output).  The 
law remained in force because a faction of California farmers who benefited from the 
legislation had captured the system’s administrative apparatus.
52   
Constantine, et al. provide a valuable perspective on the relatively recent history 
of the California one-variety law, but they say little about the early history of the state’s 
experience, and they ignore a far larger, but more short-lived, southern one-variety 
movement.  Understanding the movement outside of California not only provides a 
fresh perspective on the sources of southern development, but also helps in evaluating 
the one-variety legislation in California.
53  
Although there were fits and starts in the one-variety movement in the traditional 
Cotton South dating back to the World War I era, there were few lasting 
accomplishments.  But the USDA intensified its efforts, initiating one-variety 
campaigns throughout the South in 1931/32.  These were often tied with education and 
other cotton improvement programs. Almost all early studies reported immediate 
increases in yields and in quality in one-variety programs and most reported at least 
modest financial returns to farmers.
54 
                                                 
52 Constantine, Alston, and Smith, “Economic Impacts,” pp. 951-74.  Constantine, Alston, and Smith 
were not alone in noting that the need for different varieties on different soils could be a major problem 
for the one-variety concept.  Campbell’s studies reported that Oklahoma farmers were concerned about 
yield losses due to the inability to fine tune varieties to local conditions.  He also noted that although one-
variety communities increased the standardization of the product, there was still considerable variance 
within a one-variety community so that the bales had to be resorted as with non-one-variety community 
production.  Campbell, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 5-19; Campbell, “Comparisons,” pp. 7-33.  Other 
critics of one-variety communities raised the fear that widespread standardization of varieties might 
expose farmers to catastrophic losses should a new disease appear for which the standardized variety 
lacked resistance.  K. S. Quisenberry, “The Role of Public and Private Agencies in Cotton Improvement,” 
pp. 1-8, Dallas TX, Feb. 2, 1954, Delta and Pine Land Company Records, Box XV, Miscellaneous, Joint 
Cotton Breeders Policy Committee file (2/8), 1953-54 in Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, 
Mississippi State University.  Hereafter other sources from this collection cited as D&PL archives. 
53 Even other Acala growing states differed.  For example, the one-variety movement started in the 
Rio Grande and Pecos River areas of New Mexico in 1922.  There was no statewide one-variety 
legislation, but by the early 1930s Acala constituted more than 95 percent of the cotton grown in the state.  
As in California the foundation seed was supplied by the USDA, a system of inspection and certification 
was developed for the farms that increased the seed, and local gins developed special precautions when 
ginning planting seed.  Between 1922 and 1932 the state’s yields increased from 201 to 412 pounds of lint 
per acre (roughly on par with what occurred in California), with local observers giving most of the credit 
to the community production system with its pure seed program.  Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 
106-108; Leding, “Community,” pp. 1-23; USDA, Statistics on Cotton, p. 82.  
54 U.S. Congress, Hearings, 67
th Cong., 4
th Sess., Part 1, February 5, 9, & 12, 1928, p. 135. The two 
exceptions appear to have occurred in Florida and Oklahoma.  In Florida farmers evidently made a poor 
choice of varieties.  In Oklahoma studies reported significant quality increases and in 1932-33 estimated 
added revenue of about $2.31 per bale.  But in 1933-34 the estimated added benefit to one-variety 
production fell to a mere $0.33 per bale. Ballinger and McWhorter, “Results,” pp. 68-71. See Porter, 
“Toward Standardized Cotton,” pp. 21-22.  
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The movement started in Georgia in 1931.  By the end of 1934, there were 45 
communities in various stages of development and preliminary work was underway in 
starting 25 others. The one-variety producers were immediately rewarded with higher 
yields, along with quality and length premiums valued at about $7.13 an acre.
55  In 
Oklahoma the one-variety movement began in earnest in 1932.  By early 1933 there 
were 6 communities with over 25,000 acres and 11,000 farmers participating.
56  In  
Mississippi, 14 communities were organized in 1931, with the number growing to 33 in 
1932; six of these were countywide organizations.  By 1937 there were 197 
communities in the state, receiving an estimated average increase in revenue (stemming 
from increased yields and premiums) of $8.71 per acre for one-variety producers.
57 A 
similar transformation of cotton production was taking place across the South during the 
1930s.  
From the humble beginnings in the 1930s, the movement took off.  Table 3 
pieces together key indices of the extent of the one-variety movement for the years 
1934-1949.  By 1946 there were about 2,275 one-variety communities, producing 
roughly one half of the entire cotton output of the United States.  Table 4 provides data 
on the distribution of one-variety production across the various states.  These data 
clearly indicate that California was not alone in one-variety production.  In fact, in 1946 
California accounted for less than 2 percent of the community members, less than 5 
percent of the acreage in one-variety communities, and about 10 percent of community 
output in the United States.  California was different because of the size of the 
participating farms and the legal rigidity of the system, not because its farmers were 
banding together ostensibly to overcome negative externalities and to capture 
economies of scale in grading, information, and marketing.
58   
A clearer image of the micro-structure and daily operations of the southern one-
variety communities may be distilled from numerous descriptions in experiment station 
and cotton trade publications.  The organizing effort was typically initiated by a small 
group of local farmers working with the county extension agent, who would call a 
meeting and provide a set of suggested standardized bylaws.  The proposed “Cotton 
                                                 
55 Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 67-72; Westbrook, “One-Variety Community,” pp. 3-8; and 
Bledsoe and Westbrook, “History,” pp. 16-19.  The $7.13 estimate comes from Bledsoe and Westbrook. 
56 Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 80-88.  Coruthers gives the membership and acreage for only 
5 of the 6 communities. 
57 Willis, One Variety Cotton, pp. 1-2; Coruthers, “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 60-63.  
58 According to E. C. Westbrook, in 1956 all one-variety communities were voluntary except in 
California.  Westbrook, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 17.  
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Improvement Association” was to be established as a non-profit, unincorporated 
cooperative association.  Membership was voluntary and involved no fees or dues.   
Under some bylaws, membership was “open to any cotton grower” who agreed to the 
one-variety regulations; in others, new members were admitted with the approval of 
existing members.  Conditions for exit also varied.  In some agreements members could 
withdraw at any time, and those who failed to comply with community rules were 
automatically dropped without penalty.  Other bylaws specified a 5-year membership 
term.  In almost all bylaws the association’s membership periodically selected by 
majority rule (on a one-member one-vote basis) the variety to be grown and elected a 
small board responsible for the daily operations.  The association also formed a 
relationship with a local gin.  If only a fraction of the local growers choose to enter the 
association, the one-variety community arranged with the ginner to set aside specific 
days or specific machines to handle members’ crop with special care.  Thus, the 
southern one-variety communities were not nearly as compulsory as in the California 
model.
59 
The community acquired foundation seed from a private breeder (such as D&PL, 
Stoneville, or Coker) or a state experiment station.  A common arrangement was to 
purchase annually one bushel of foundation seed for each 100 acres of cotton in the 
community.  A small number of selected growers planted this seed in isolated fields, 
harvested and ginned the resulting seed cotton in a manner to ensure purity, and then 
exchanged the so-called first-year seed to other members at setprices that were well 
below the market price of the foundation seed.  The other members agreed to plant at 
least one-tenth of their acreage with this first-year seed, producing sufficient second-
year seed for their remaining acreage in the next season.
60  To help maintain purity, all 
of the cotton grown from the foundation seed was to be ginned under close supervision 
before any of that grown from the first-year seed, which in turn was ginned before that 
grown from the second-year seed.  The resulting third-year seed was to be sold to the oil 
mill.  As the USDA put it, this plan “provides for a continuous flow of new, pure 
                                                 
59 Willis, One-Variety Cotton; Westbrook,  “One-Variety Community;” Leding, “Community 
Production;” Wasson, One Variety Cotton; Lowery, Cotton; and Rains, Cotton. 
60 This method of expanding the seed supply represented a large-scale collective implementation of 
the 1-10-100 technique recommended by extension agents and seed companies (such as Coker’s) to 
individual farmers for maintaining pure seed.  Coker’s, Spring 1917, p. 16.  For a detailed guide on how 
to organize a one-variety community see Bode Hughes, “Organizing Communities,” D&PL Company 
Records, Box XV, Miscellaneous file (2/2) , D&PL archives.  
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breeder or foundation seed into the community each year and a continuous outflow of 





During the mid-1930s, the one-variety movement pushed beyond its campaign to 
restructure cotton production into a more long-lasting effort to reform marketing.  Given 
the prevailing weak market incentives to produce higher quality cotton, farmers in many 
one-variety communities purportedly began to complain they were not being properly 
rewarded for their labors.  In 1937 President Roosevelt signed the Smith-Doxey Cotton 
Classing Act that was meant to complement the traditional one-variety communities.
62  
The act that went into effect in 1938 made free market news service and cotton classing 
available to all organized cotton improvement groups.  The act was to be largely self-
supporting (through the sale of the sample material) and benefit almost everyone up and 
down the marketing chain except perhaps local buyers-graders.  Smith-Doxey 
classification cards became accepted within the trade, cutting marketing costs by 
reducing the need to repeatedly re-sample and re-grade cotton bales every time they 
changed hands.  The primary aim of the program was to better align the incentives given 
to small farmers by narrowing the discrepancies between grading in local and central 
markets.  Under the Smith-Doxey program farmers could mail cotton samples to one of 
31 central locations established throughout the Cotton Belt and within a few days 
receive by return mail a government certified “green card” specifying the cotton’s 
grade, length, etc.  There was a catch.  To qualify for the free services a farmer had to 
be a member of an organized cotton improvement group with at least 10 members.  
These Smith-Doxey districts were typically much less formal than one-variety 
communities, and in some cases simply represented an agreement between a group of 
farmers and a ginner to provide special care in handling the group’s one variety.  The 
Smith-Doxey districts played no role in breeding, increasing, or marketing seed.  A 
bureaucratic difference was that Smith-Doxey groups were organized out of the USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service, whereas the One-Variety Community project was under 
                                                 
61 U.S. Congress, Hearings, 80
th Cong., 1
st  Sess., Part 2, October 10, 1947, p. 960. 
62 U.S. Congress, Authorizing the Secretary, 75
th Cong, 1
st Sess., Report No. 143, February 24, 1937, 
pp. 1-3, and U.S. Congress, Letter, 75
th Cong., 1
st Sess., Vol 81, Part 3, p. 3164.  
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the aegis of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering.  On the 
ground, both programs were administered by the cooperative extension service.
63   
A pair of USDA belt-wide surveys on classification practices and the availability 
of information in the 1935-36 and 1947-48 crop years provide some sense of the 
changes wrought by the Smith-Doxey Act.  The first survey, conducted by John W. 
Wright, revealed just how poorly informed many growers were when they sold their 
cotton before the act.
64  This survey of 101 local markets found that 36 percent of 
growers sold their cotton with no information about general market prices except their 
price offer, and that 60 percent of growers (accounting for 60 percent of the crop) sold 
their cotton without knowing its grade or staple length.  Even when growers reported 
knowledge of their cotton’s quality at the time of sale, the most common source of this 
information was the buyer (29 percent of cotton).  Less than 10 percent of cotton was 
classified by impartial parties—the USDA, licensed classers, warehousemen, factors, or 
ginners.
65  Dissatisfaction with poor information purportedly was widespread.  Nearly 
six-tenths of cotton growers reported a willingness to maintain a self-supporting 
sampling service to provide official classification.  Most ginners surveyed (84 percent) 
also favored such a service.  By way of contrast, most first-buyers disliked the idea and 
reported a disinclination to base their purchases on official classes.  The market 
situation illustrated in this report, especially the weak bargaining position of growers in 
local cotton markets, created pressures for reform.
66 
The 1947 follow-up study revealed substantial improvements in price and 
quality information available to growers since 1935.
67  In the 1947-48 crop year only 
about 25 percent of growers, who accounted for about 15 percent of U.S. cotton output, 
sold without having independent information about general cotton prices.  Only 45 
percent of growers (with 30 percent of the cotton) sold their crop without knowing its 
quality (again down from the 60 percent of producers and output in the 1935-36 
                                                 
63 Betts, “Green Card,” pp. 13-16; USDA, “Report of the Chief,” pp. 36-39. 
64 Wright, Marketing Practices. 
65 Ibid., pp. 20-23.  Besides surveying growers, the study also queried first-buyers regarding their 
practices.  These buyers reported relatively little cotton—only 11 percent—was purchased without any 
effort to classify the cotton in individual bales.  The author expressed skepticism, however, about the 
thoroughness of the first-buyers’ own classification efforts.  Only one-third of first buyers owned or had 
access to a copy of the official cotton standards.  Ibid., pp. 29-30.  The problems associated with 
imperfect information about quality obviously were not limited to cotton, and during the first half of the 
20
th century the USDA established standards for grading most agricultural products.  Given the 
technology of the time, classing cotton was probably more difficult than grading most major crops. 
66 Ibid., pp. 60-62. 
67 Soxman, Marketing.  This study covered 98 of 101 local markets analyzed in the 1935-36 study.  
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season).  In 1947-48 growers with impartially provided quality information sold 52 
percent of the cotton crop, up from just 9 percent of the crop in 1935-36.  The spread of 
the Smith-Doxey system accounted for much of the change.  In 1947-48, 40 percent of 
the crop in the markets studied received green cards (Form 1 classifications) by the time 
of sale.
68  The study concluded that in 1947 growers “generally occupied a stronger 
bargaining position than in 1935” when “most growers reported knowing neither the 
market price nor the quality of their cotton at the time of sale.”
69 
The Smith-Doxey program apparently went a long way to correcting the 
problems highlighted in the cotton pricing studies of the 1920s and 1930s.  For example, 
based on a survey that recorded the pricing of about 300,000 bales of cotton in 24 local 
markets across the cotton-belt over the 1951-52 to 1953-53 seasons, William Faught 
concluded that: 
prices to growers in markets where cotton is sold on the basis of Smith-Doxey cards … 
reflected central market differentials for grade and staple rather fully and accurately.  In 
markets where growers did not have or did not use reliable quality information in the 




In local markets where most “cotton was sold on the basis of Smith-Doxey 
cards” the price reflected, on average, 78 percent of central market differentials whereas 
in local markets where “cotton quality information was not readily available to growers” 
the price reflected only 3 percent of differentials.
71  As officials at the Texas agricultural 
                                                 
68 Ibid., pp. 12, 69. The use of the Smith-Doxey system was unevenly distributed across the cotton 
belt and over farms of different sizes.  Virtually all cotton growers in Arizona, California, and New 
Mexico received Form 1 classing, as did about one-half of the growers in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and 
Texas, and one-quarter of the growers in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi., Ibid., p. 16.  Larger 
growers were far more likely than smaller farmers to sell on the basis of Form 1 classification, Ibid., pp. 
12, 16, 62, 69.  Many buyers expressed an unwillingness to use the government classification system. 
A study conducted in the same crop year by Southern Regional Cotton Marketing Project comparing 
the behaviors of participants and non-participants in one-variety communities found that, except in the 
high plains, participants were far more likely to use USDA classification services.  Faught, et al., Cotton, 
p. 28. 
69 Soxman, Marketing, pp. 2, 69. 
70 Faught, Cotton Price, p. 3.  Faught noted that farmers who were enrolled in the Smith-Doxey 
service but did not use the green card at the time of sale frequently did not receive full central market 
differentials.  Often these farmers sold their cotton so quickly after ginning that the government 
classification information was not yet available.  Ibid., p. 22. 
71 Ibid., pp. 14-15 and 26-27.  As is often the case in the American federal system, experiments 
initiated by individual states subsequently provide a model for national programs.  This appears to have 
been the case with the Smith-Doxey classification system.  In the early 1920s, at the urging of local Farm 
Bureaus, the California State Department of Agriculture began a public classing service.  In addition, 
farmers in some areas organized selling agencies to handle bulk sales.  The combination of these 
programs resulted in a price premium of “1½ to 3 cents a pound over that [cotton] of similar grade sold 
independently in the local yard on the same day.”  The fact that California Farm Bureau members, who in 
the main would have been relatively educated and informed producers, requested and benefited from such 
a program suggests that the benefits for most southern producers could have been substantial.  
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extension service put it: “Smith-Doxey has probably done more than anything else to 
breach the traditional system of hog ’round buying.”
72 
As a result of the advantages of the Smith-Doxey program, participation rapidly 
increased.  Table 5 provides summary data of the growth of the program between 1938 
and 1952.  By 1951 about 65 percent of American cotton was being graded under this 
system.  The diffusion of this new organizational form proceeded at a pace rivaling the 
era’s better known mechanical and biological technologies.  In the 1954 season just 
under three-quarters of the U.S. crop was classified under the program.  And from the 
mid-1960s to the present, Smith-Doxey cotton represented roughly 95 percent of the 
crop.
73  In summary, detailed quantitative studies on the diffusion and impact of Smith-
Doxey services suggest that the program had a significant impact on narrowing the gap 
between local and central markets in cotton classing.
74   
 
THE REVOLUTION IN U.S. COTTON PRODUCTION  
 
  There were many quantitative indices of the revolution in U.S. cotton 
production, including changes in cotton quality and in varietal concentration.  Just as the 
one-variety advocates had planned, there was an almost immediate increase in the staple 
length in one-variety districts compared to nearby areas.  The aggregate data on the 
length of U.S. cotton reflected these developments.  Figure 2 shows that between 1928-
33 and 1945-49 the average length of U.S. upland cotton increased by about one-eight 
of an inch, or four staple lengths.  This was accomplished by the systematic substitution 
of medium-staple varieties for short-staple varieties.  The percentage of upland cotton 
29/32 of an inch and less fell from over 50 percent in 1928-32 to less than 14 percent in 
1944-49.  Between 1928-30 and 1946-47 the percent equal to or greater than 1 inch 
increased from about 22 percent to about 73 percent.  Mississippi has traditionally been 
known for producing high quality cotton. 
                                                 
72 Texas A&M College Extension Service, New Agriculture, p. 37. 
73 USDA, Consumer and Marketing Service, Story, n.p. 
74 We do not know the extent of double counting in the data on one-variety communities presented in 
Table 3 and the Smith-Doxey data shown in Table 5.  But from Brown and Ware’s account it is likely that 
many one-variety communities were Smith-Doxey groups, but that Smith-Doxey groups generally were 
not enumerated as one-variety communities.  In addition, Brown and Ware noted that after 1948 Smith-
Doxey groups “have taken the place of one-variety communities in many areas, especially in large 
portions of the main Cotton South.”  This implies that it is at least possible, even likely, that by 1946 well 
over 50 percent of U.S. cotton production came from one or the other of these forms of community 
organizations.  Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 83.  
 
21
Writing in 1950, J. F. O’Kelly noted that “twenty years ago only 31 per cent of the 
cotton produced in Mississippi was 1 to 1-1/32 inches.  Currently 92 per cent of the 
State’s cotton is in this staple range.”
75  At the other end of the scale, cotton less than 
one inch fell from 45 percent in 1928-30 to about 2 percent of Mississippi’s production 
in 1946-47.  Similar progress occurred across the Cotton Belt.  As an example, “the 
South Carolina crop went from an estimated 20 percent cotton stapling 15/16 inch and 
longer in length in 1926 to over 97 percent of such lengths in 1943.  With this increase 
in length there has also been an increase in per acre yield.”
76 A number of factors such 
as changing cultural practices surely contributed to the change in cotton quality and 
yields.  But the rapidity of the change (with local yield increases and longer staples 
reported within a couple of years following the introduction of a community), and 
widespread contemporary testimony point to the one-variety movement as an important 
catalyst for the changes.
77 
In addition to promoting the production of longer-staple cottons, the one-variety 
program contributed to a dramatic decline in the number of varieties of cotton grown in 
the United States. One-variety advocates saw this decline in bio-diversity as a positive 
step.  One of the USDA’s initial goals was to significantly reduce the number of 
varieties, in order to eliminate inferior cottons, to reduce the problems of cross-
pollination and gin mixing, and to promote standardization of the resulting product.  
Nobody really knows how many varieties and strains of cotton were being grown in the 
American South in 1930. 
  
                                                 
75 O’Kelly, “Cotton,” pp. 36-37. 
76 U.S. Congress, Testimony of George J. Wilds, in Hearings, 78
th Cong., 2
nd Sess., December 4-9, 
1944, p. 399.  Wilds was the president Coker’s Pedigreed Seed Company.   
77 For one example attributing the improvements to the one-variety-community movement and of the 
rapidity of the change see Ware, “Plant Breeding,” p. 662.  According to most commentators one-variety 
communities facilitated education campaigns and provided incentives that stimulated the adoption of 
better cultural methods.  See Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 84.  Our assessment of the premiums and 
discounts suggests that the economic significance to farmers of increased fiber length was probably much 
less than the impact of higher yields.  Over the period 1930-60 increasing the staple length by 1/8 of an 
inch from a base from 7/8 to 1 inch (the rough range that applied to most farmers) generally resulted in a 
premium of only 5-10 percent.  The premiums were non-linear because for increases in length for longer 
cottons the premiums were much larger.  The relatively small premium in the length range applicable to 
most farmers may represent yet another example of what agricultural economists refer to as the “Cochran 
Effect,” meaning that the benefits of a technological change are largely passed on to consumers.   
According to O’Kelly, “Cotton,” p. 51, “Varieties producing a medium staple length (1 to 1 3/32 inch) 
have been the favorites for at least two decades.  In many of the Cotton Belt states 75 to 95 per cent of the 
cotton produced is in this length range.  This fact has considerably reduced the discounts in the markets 
for lengths just shorter than one inch and has greatly increased the premiums paid for lengths 1 1/8 inches 
and longer.”  
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In 1907 Tyler listed over 600 varieties, and given the tendency for the number to 
increase due to mutations and cross-pollination, it is likely that substantially more 
existed at the dawn of the one-variety movement. Westbrook claimed that there were 
about 300 varieties being grown in Georgia alone in 1930.
78  Many of these so-called 
varieties were undoubtedly just different local names for the same variety, but the exact 
number is not so important as the general magnitude in relation to what existed after the 
one-variety movement picked up steam.  With rare exceptions, such as the Acala 
communities in the West, no single variety dominated a given region or state in 1930.  
This situation changed rapidly.   
In 1954 only 10 varietal types (a variety such as Acala had several strains) 
accounted for over 77 percent of the cotton grown in the United States, and 5 pure 
varieties accounted for almost 52 percent of the nation’s crop.  A single variety 
(Deltapine 15) made up 25.5 percent of all U.S. cotton acreage.
79  Contemporaries 
credited the one-variety campaign with playing a major role in causing the 
concentration of varieties.  As an example, according to the 1947 Congressional 
hearings on cotton quality “the one-variety program has reduced the number of varieties 
grown and standardized the entire crop of the organized areas on a few improved high-
yielding varieties.”
80 Brown and Ware were equally emphatic: “The cotton-varietal-
standardization movement...has practically made over the situation in cotton varieties in 
America and has thereby contributed greatly to quality improvement of cotton.”
81 
State-level data offer a clearer sense of the movement toward varietal 
concentration, because by the early 1950s several states had effectively become de facto 
one or two variety enclaves (see Table 6).  These enclaves transcended state boundaries; 
as an example, Coker 100 Wilt comprised over 95 percent of the cotton grown in South 
Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.  In many states the extent of de facto one-
variety production far exceeded the production of official one-variety communities.   
Even in states with a greater number of varieties, such as Texas, a given region likely 
                                                 
78 Westbrook, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 16.  Westbrook’s assertion that 1200 varieties had been 
grown in the United States in 1930 is probably a misreading of Ware.  A 1947 Congressional report on 
cotton asserted that before the one-variety cotton movement over 500 were grown. U.S. Congress, 
Hearings, 80
th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, October 10, 1947, p. 955.  
79 Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 97.  
80 U.S. Congress, Hearings, 80
th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, October 10, 1947, p. 960.  With the 
introduction of one-variety communities the decline in the number of varieties happened fairly rapidly in 
local areas.  As an example, the county agent for Carroll County, Georgia, reported that between 1933 
and 1937 the land in one variety went from a few acres to 25,000 acres and the number of varieties grown 
in the county had dropped in half.  Wiley, “Cotton,” pp. 46-47. 
81 Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 98.  
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had a high concentration of a specific commercial variety whether or not there was a 
formal association of farmers.
82  In 1952, 35 percent of U.S. cotton was ginned in 
counties where one variety comprised 90 percent or more of acreage, and 46 percent 
came from counties where one variety accounted for 75 percent of the acreage.
83  
Across the South local studies reported net benefits to one-variety community 
members similar to those we reported above (p. 14).  In addition, USDA scientists 
generated a number of more global estimates.  In 1943 the Bureau of Plant Industry, 
Soils and Agricultural Engineering estimated that one-variety producers were receiving 
an additional return of $7.50 an acre.  In 1945, C. B. Doyle reported a benefit of about 
$7.00 an acre to participating growers.  He further reported that the USDA had invested 
$800,000 from 1911 through 1944 in creating the one-variety community system, and 
that this investment had generated an annual return in excess of $56,000,000 in 1944 
alone.  In 1950 the USDA estimated that one-variety communities had generated an 
increased value to growers in the “old belt” over the 1938-1945 period of $260 million.  
The USDA reported cumulative expenditures on one-variety community development 
up to and including 1945 of less than one million dollars.
84  In its presentations to 
Congress during the late 1930s and early 1940s, the USDA showcased the one-variety 
movement as one of its high profile programs, consistently reporting annual net benefits 
to participants in the range of $5 to $7 per acre.
85  This compares with an average value 
of cotton lint of $33.90 per acre over the 1935-44 period.
86   
Another important indicator that the one-variety movement contributed to the 
revolution in cotton production is the widespread support it received beyond the USDA, 
Extension Service, and grower communities.  Representatives of the cotton textile 
                                                 
82 The High Plains region of Texas and Oklahoma has been an outlier, following a different path of 
technological development from the rest of the Cotton South and the Far West.  Farmers on the High 
Plains adopted a low input and low output strategy of production resulting in lower quality and lower 
yields than other regions.  High Plains farmers were more likely to use strippers instead of spindle 
pickers, and they have traditionally used fewer chemicals to control insects, diseases, and weeds.     
Farmers in this region were far more likely to reuse their own seed or buy seed from local producers.  As 
a result, national seed breeding companies largely avoided the region and did not invest in developing 
better varieties tailored to its needs.   
83 Compiled from USDA, Production and Marketing Administration, Cotton Branch, Cotton.  The 
shares are based on 1952 acreage and 1951 ginnings.  With the concentration in varieties came a parallel 
concentration in the number of seed breeders and seed distributors.  By 1961, “four large companies 
produce the cotton seed that is used on 90 percent of the planted acreage in the Southern and Southeastern 
States.”  Waddle and Colwick, “Producing Seeds,” p. 188.  
84 Porter, “Toward Standardized Cotton,” pp. 21-22; Doyle, “One-Variety-Cotton”; U.S. Congress, 
House Committee on Agriculture, Research, pp. 754-55.  
85 See for example, U.S. Congress, Hearings, 75
th Cong., 3
rd Sess., pp. 317-19 and 938-40, and U.S. 
Congress, Hearings, 78
th Cong., 1
st Sess., pp. 328-29. 
86 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Series K553-555.  
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industry, prominent breeders, leading shippers, and southern bankers all lauded the 
movement’s contributions.
87  In light of the subsequent developments in government 
policy regarding intellectual property rights in genetic materials, it is important to 
understand the incentive structure and position of private seed companies regarding 
one-variety communities.  The innovative seed companies faced a number of 
interrelated problems.  Such a firm’s primary contribution was its investment in 
research and development to produce new plant varieties; its value added in cleaning or 
providing seed treatments was generally secondary.  As principally a seller of 
intellectual property, a seed company had to be able to exert market power and price 
above marginal cost to recoup its sunk R&D expenses.  But even if a company could 
exercise market power, it faced the problems of a durable good monopolist–namely, it 
created its own competition–to an especially severe degree.  In the textbook view, a 
durable goods monopolist suffers from the following time inconsistency problem: it has 
an incentive to sell initially to high-demand buyers at a high price and in subsequent 
periods lower prices (or equivalently offer improved quality for the same price) to 
attract the lower-demand buyers.  But this threat causes the high-demand buyers to 
lower the initial price they are willing to offer.  The preferred solution for the durable 
good monopolist is to lease the good, that is, sell the services rather than the good 
outright.  If this proves infeasible, the firm may reduce the inter-temporal competition 
by reducing the durability of the good (planned obsolescence).
88  Obviously this reduces 
the value of the good to the buyer and the firm must weigh this negative price effect 
against the positive effect in sustaining its market power to determine the optimal level 
of durability.
89   
For seed producers, the problem of inter-temporal competition is especially 
severe because the seed possesses the natural ability to produce multiple offspring.  (For 
cotton, the multiple was on the order of 10 to 30 to one.)  Hence, a farmer could 
purchase commercial seed to meet a fraction of his requirements and within a few 
seasons raise enough for his whole operation and have a surplus to sell to his neighbors.  
The seed companies could partially offset this latter form of competition through 
quality-control guarantees and branding.  But in an environment with weak intellectual 
                                                 
87 Merrill, Macormac, and Mauersberger, American Cotton, p. 116; U.S. Congress, Hearings, 78
th 
Cong., 2
nd. Sess., December 4-9, 1944, p. 399; “One-Variety Cotton,” pp. 103-104. 
88 These are only a few of the alternatives available.  Another preferred solution for the durable good 
monopolist is to creditably commit to a price schedule or to provide buyback offers. 
89 Bulow, “Durable-Goods,” pp. 314-332 and “Economic Theory,” pp. 729–49.  
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property protection, a company could not easily or effectively prevent its gene stock 
from serving as the basis of a competitor’s “improved” variety.  These forces help 
explain why the desideratum for commercial seed breeders was a product without the 
ability to reproduce naturally; a seed such as a F2 hybrid or one with a Terminator gene. 
In recent decades cottonseed companies have been among the most vocal 
opponents of the one-variety law in California.
90  Breeders also opposed more ambitious 
New Deal plans for the South. Shortly after the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA) began, leaders of the Cotton Section developed a program patterned on the 
California model for the South. This was a relatively centralized scheme that would 
have empowered the directors of the state experiment stations to choose one variety of 
cotton for communities in their states. The directors were supposed to consider the 
diversity in growing conditions in defining community boundaries, but the hope was 
that large areas, possibly entire states, might convert to a single variety.  The plan also 
called for an expansion of government breeding and seed-distribution activities.   
According to Cully Cobb, who headed the AAA’s Cotton Section, USDA Secretary 
Henry A. Wallace had tentatively signed off on the program, but at the last minute D. R. 
Coker convinced Wallace to scuttle it.
91   
But it would be wrong to conclude that such opposition was a constant.  During 
the heyday of the one-variety community movement in the South the major seed 
companies embraced the effort and lent their support in spite of the communities’ seed 
multiplication and distribution policies.  In his 1938 article “Break This Vicious Circle 
Which Shuts You Out From Cotton Seed Sales” that appeared in the inaugural issue of 
Southern Seedman, Austin Burges argued the “opening wedge must be one-variety 
communities” and that assisting their development “means heavy extra profits for the 
seed dealer.”
92  George J. Wilds, the president of Coker’s Pedigreed Seed Company, 
spread the same message in his 1944 Congressional testimony:  “the one-variety 
community is the best solution for all of us interested in cotton.”
93  Seed company 
marketing policies conveyed the same theme.  The USDA noted that “the 1947 catalog 
                                                 
90 As an example, in 1964 D&PL purportedly encouraged dissident growers in the San Joaquin 
Valley to campaign for repeal of California’s one-variety law.  Camp, “Cotton, Irrigation,” p. 172.  D&PL 
began to push its breeder’s rights outside of the California context.  In the case of Delta and Pine Land 
Co. v. Peoples Gin Company (1982), the U.S. district court in Mississippi ruled that the Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 1970 prevented the cooperative gin from arranging the sale of collectively ginned 
cottonseed between its member farmers.  Kloppenburg, First the Seed, p. 146 
91 Cobb, “Cotton Section,” pp. 96-99.  Camp, “Cotton, Irrigation” pp. 135-38. 
92 Burges, “Break This Vicious Circle,” pp. 5, 6, 29. 
93 U.S. Congress, Hearings, 78
th Cong., 2
nd. Sess., December 4-9, 1944, p. 400.  
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of the largest commercial cottonseed breeding firm in the Southeast states” (presumably 
Coker) contained a strong endorsement of one-variety communities, asserting that they 
had been of great value to breeders, growers, and manufacturers.  The company also 
adjusted its breeding and marketing program to support cotton standardization.  Other 
breeders jumped on the bandwagon.  “To further promote standardized production two 
other large commercial breeders in the Mississippi Valley [most likely D&PL and 
Stoneville], who furnish the foundation planting seed for the great bulk of the one-
variety communities in the Central and Eastern States, have adopted the policy of 
retaining the same varietal name for their new stocks from year to year, thus simplifying 
the continued operation of the one-variety developments.”
94  Other evidence suggests 
that up to the early 1950s the major seed companies saw the growth of one-variety 
communities as a bonanza to increase sales.
95  Dr. C. W. Manning, an early breeder with 
the Stoneville Pedigreed Seed Company, recalled that his firm gladly sold to one-variety 
communities knowing full well that they planned to increase the seed and supply it to 
local farmers.  This meant “the company had to put more salesmen on the road.”
96  
Evidently in this evolutionary stage in the development of the cottonseed business some 
market was better than no market.  
  Before World War II, the leading private breeders were typically small and near 
the margins of commercial viability as stand-alone operations.  Coker’s Pedigreed Seed 
Company of Hartsville, SC, the “South’s Foremost Seed Breeders,” appears chiefly to 
be the farm improvement hobbyhorse of its wealthy, public-spirited owner, D. R Coker.  
The firm’s weak financial record over the 1920s and 1930s led Coker to consider 
handing over the operation to a philanthropic organization, such as the Rockefeller 
                                                 
94 USDA, Report of the Administrator of Agricultural Research, p. 302. 
95 Well before the onset of the one-variety community movement Coker promoted a plan whereby 
farmers would buy enough seed for a seed patch and then use the resulting seed to plant their entire crop 
the following year.  Coker catalogs also contained farmer testimonials describing how they made money 
increasing and selling the improved seed to neighbors.  While initially beneficial to seed companies, such 
policies created competition for the firms’ future sales.  Seed certification programs and later the Plant 
Variety Protection Act helped reduce this form of competition.  Webb, “Private Cotton,” pp. 522-534. 
96 Phone interview by authors with Dr. C. W. Manning of Leland Mississippi, February 1, 2002.  
Manning’s statement referred to the period around 1950.  Early C. Ewing, Sr., the head breeder at D&PL 
also linked the increased popularity of improved seeds with “the phenomenal growth of one-variety 
communities, one-variety gins, and one-variety farms….” Early C. Ewing, “History of Cotton Varieties,” 
D&PL Company Records, Box IX, “History: Published Material,” D&PL archives. 
The support that the seed breeders in the 1940s and 1950s gave the one-variety communities is somewhat 
analogous to the support book writers and publishers might provide public libraries in areas dominated by 
illiteracy.  From the book trade’s commercial standpoint, it would be better if each reader bought the book 
and could not resell it or share it with others (although advertising it by word-of-mouth would be 
welcome).    
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Foundation, to support as a southern improvement project.
97  The leading commercial 
breeding operation in the mid-South was a subdivision of the Delta and Pine Land 
Company (D&PL), a 38,000-acre plantation in the Mississippi Delta.  Building on its 
success in creating early maturing, high yielding, high quality seed for its own lands, 
D&PL became a major seed supplier.  According to Fortune, the company sold “more 
cottonseed to planters than any other single world agency” in the mid-1930s.
98  Yet for 
all of D&PL’s prominence, its sales over the 1925-1934 decade averaged only about 
1,060 tons per year, which represented less than one percent of the seed planted for the 
U.S. cotton crop.  Figure 3, graphing D&PL sales from 1925 to 1964, shows that this 
situation changed significantly after the one-variety movement took hold. The series 
reveals many ups and down reflecting weather conditions and inter-firm competition.
99  
Despite a 62 percent reduction in U.S. cotton acreage and a more than 50 percent 
decline in seeding rates, D&PL sales over the 1955-64 period were over seven times 
those prevailing 30 years earlier.   
It is possible to obtain a summary view of the change in the source of seed 
supply.  According to various accounts the vast majority of seed used before 1930 was 
“gin run.”  As noted above, Doyle asserted that in the 1920s and in the early 1930s only 
5 to 10 percent of cotton planting seed came from breeders and dealers.  By 1955, 
purchased seed made up 74 percent of the cottonseed used for planting.
100  Notably, 70 
percent of the purchased seed and 52 percent of all planting seed in 1955 was comprised 
                                                 
97 Rogers and Nelson, Mr. D. R., pp.152-73, 197; Coclanis, “David R. Coker,” pp. 105-114. 
98 “Delta & Pine Land Co.,” p. 158. 
99 For example, bad weather wiped out the seed crop in 1937.  Later the company subcontracted seed 
production to reduce climatic risks. Compiled from Annual Statements and President’s Reports, D&PL 
Company Records, Box 2, D&PL archives. 
100 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Agriculture 1954, p. 19.  The survey shows that 583,000 
farmers purchased 194,100 tons of cottonseed for planting.  This information, together with the 1954 
Census production data, implies that purchased seed was used on over two-thirds of cotton farms.  The 
total amount of cottonseed used for planting comes from Table 192 of USDA, Statistics, p. 232. 
Paralleling the one-variety community movement was a more general campaign to improve seed varieties 
centered on the activities of the International Crop Improvement Association.  The Association was 
chartered in 1920 with members from across the United States and Canada.  The aims were to limit 
fraudulent practices in the seed business, prevent the loss of valuable varieties as a result of contamination 
with other varieties, and develop international standards for seed identification and distribution.  The 
Association developed field and laboratory standards, regulations to ensure proper isolation and handling 
of seed breeding and increase programs, a system of uniform seals and tags to identify pure seed, and 
uniform definitions for classification and certification.  The Association also successfully lobbied to 
obtain legal backing for its standards.  The Association established uniform cottonseed certification 
standards in 1926.  As the terminology evolved, “foundation seed” was developed by the breeder; 
“registered seed” represented the first year’s multiplication of foundation seed (under tightly controlled 
conditions); and “certified seed” represented the multiplication of registered seed (again, under controlled 




101  In 1971, only about 19 percent of cotton farms nationally (with 19 
percent of acreage) planted seeds they grew themselves.  The fractions were even lower 
if Oklahoma and Texas are excluded.  Outside of these states, 15 percent of farms (with 
13 percent of acreage) reported using homegrown seed.  At this time, certified seed was 
planted on 64 percent of cotton farms nationally (and 74 percent of those outside 
Oklahoma and Texas).
102   
The timing of the takeoff in the adoption of improved seed varieties clearly 
predates adoption of the mechanical harvester because between 1940 and 1945 the acres 
of certified cottonseed planted in the United States tripled.  (See Table 7.)  In 1940, 
there were 98,000 acres approved to produce certified cottonseed.  At prevailing seed 
yields (0.236 tons per acre over the 1946-48 period) and seeding rates (32 pounds per 
acre), the output of this acreage would have been sufficient to plant less than 6 percent 
of U.S. cotton land (outside California).  By the 1952-54 period, there was an average of 
577,000 acres approved, producing sufficient certified seed for over half of U.S. cotton 
land (outside California).  Moreover, the average quality of non-certified seed also 
increased, because it was apt to be only a few generations removed from certified seed.  
After the mid 1950s the number of approved acres fluctuated, but the percentage of the 
crop planted with certified seed continued to grow because with improved seed 
varieties, delinting (see below), and improved mechanical seeders, the amount of 
planting seed required per acre of cotton declined substantially.
103 
 
                                                 
101The data on certified seed come from Saunders, Report 1954, pp. 47-50 and 102.  The certified 
seed data omit seed produced by government agencies in California (and likely in other states) and thus 
understate the total production of high quality seed.  The shares reported in the text include our estimates 
for the pure seed used in California. 
102 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1969 Census. 
103 Hackleman and Scott, History, p. 53.  Acres planted come from USDA, Statistics, p. 63.  By 1980, 
nearly all planting seed outside the High Plains was certified.  Although early accounts claimed that 
delinting saved about 20 percent of the planting seed, increases in seed quality and improved cultural 
methods led to further declines.  Between the 1930s and the 1990s, seed planting rates outside the High 
Plains declined from about 34 pounds per acre to as low as 8 pounds an acre. 
The general seed literature often presents figures indicating that in the recent period U.S. planting 
cottonseed is split 50-50 between homegrown and commercial sources.  See, for example, Butler and 
Marion, Impacts.  This view is incorrect.  In tracking back the citation chain, we have found no solid basis 
for this conventional estimate.  Indeed, it conflicts with 1971 survey results in the special report on cotton 
in the 1969 Census of Agriculture.  
 
29
THE DEMISE OF THE ONE-VARIETY MOVEMENT  
 
By the mid-1950s the USDA had de-emphasized its one-variety community 
campaign in the South.  After 1952, the USDA Bureau of Plant Industry “relinquished 
much of its part” in the one-variety program and began closing many of its regional 
offices.  By the end of 1954, the program was “turned over to the agricultural extension 
services.”
104  In roughly the same period, the Agricultural Marketing Service also de-
emphasized the requirement that farmers be members of a cotton improvement group, 
opening up Smith-Doxey classification to farmers who contacted their county agents.
105  
From the USDA’s perspective, the program had served its purpose of educating farmers 
of the importance of growing high quality cotton and a number of technological and 
institutional changes made the one-variety concept less appealing.  The maturation of a 
commercial seed industry able to supply abundant quantities of high quality foundation 
seed was an important reason for the demise of one-variety communities in the 
traditional Cotton South. With the increased presence of quality private breeders and 
strict new seed certification systems, the seed increase activities of one-variety 
communities became unnecessary.  At this juncture the South took a different path than 
California where a legally entrenched bureaucracy, with its own internal seed-breeding 
program, prevented competition from private breeders.  Southern one-variety 
communities, which were more loosely organized and did not have in-house research 
and breeding operations, were always dependent on private breeders or experiment 
stations for their foundation seed.  
The development of high-quality varieties that gained favor over wide areas was 
just one of a series of economic and technological changes that made one-variety 
communities obsolete in the South and may help account for the finding that 
California’s system was inefficient by the late 1970s.  Among the most important of 
these changes was the development and diffusion of acid delinting (and later other 
chemical treatments) of planting seed.  This technology would eventually strengthen the 
position of commercial seed companies, increase on-farm productivity, and facilitate the 
mechanization of the last major bastion of hand labor in the production of cotton. 
                                                 
104 Westbrook, “One-Variety Cotton,” p. 17.  In most areas of the South, the state extension services 
had folded the one-variety program into the new “Seven-Step Cotton program” beginning in 1945.  This 
program also addressed emerging issues such as cotton mechanization and chemical application.  USDA, 
Report of Cooperative Extension Work, 1946, p. 29. 
105 USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, “Get Your Green Card,” pp. 4-5.  The Smith-Doxey 
services continue to this day, although the program is now called Form 1 classification.  
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When upland cotton is ginned, the seeds remain “fuzzy” because the gin fails to 
remove all of the lint.  Throughout the ages farmers planted fuzzy seed and then 
chopped (thinned) the cotton plants to obtain an even stand.  Chopping cotton was a 
labor-intensive activity, requiring nearly as many worker-hours as picking.  Fuzzy seed 
worked poorly with mechanical seeders because it would clump together and clog the 
machines.  Clumping also made obtaining a well-spaced, uniform stand difficult 
whether the seed was planted by hand or by machine.  More precise planting to a row 
greatly reduced the need for chopping, increased yields, and allowed for more efficient 
machine cultivation.
106  The solution was to delint the cotton, using one of several 
technologies.  In California, the use of machines to delint planting seed dates to the 
beginning of the industry and was widespread by the 1940s.
107  By the 1950s the 
technology had gained popularity in the Cotton South, and it remained the most 
common form of delinting to the early 1970s.
108  Essentially the cotton was reginned 
using special machinery designed to remove most of the lint.  This helped in planting 
with machines, but the remaining lint still made it difficult to obtain an even stand, and 
thus the need for chopping continued.  The next stage was to expose the mechanically 
delinted seed to an intense flame to burn off the remaining lint.  This improved the 
seeds’ handling characteristics but not sufficiently for precision metering during 
planting.
109  The ultimate solution was to use one of several acid processes to 
chemically delint the seed.  Besides allowing farmers to mechanize seeding operations 
and dispense with chopping, acid delinted seed offered several other advantages.   
Delinting (and indirectly the more even spacing of plants) allowed cotton to come to a 
stand earlier, which was a real plus, especially given the threat of the boll weevil.  In 
addition, acid delinting reduced plant diseases and greatly increased germination rates.  
For these reasons, farmers need much less planting seed.
110 
Delinting cottonseed with acid on the farm was an unpleasant and hazardous 
task.  Experiment station reports provided detailed instructions on how to prepare the 
                                                 
106 Alexander, Arkansas, p. 81; Hopper and McDaniel, “Cotton,” p. 299. 
107 Camp, “Cotton Culture,” p. 8. 
108 Machine delinting in the South was common earlier because the linters had value, especially 
during World War I when they were used to make munitions.  Agelasto, et al., “Cotton,” pp. 381-83.  
Evidence on the use of delinted seed for planting is sparse, but as early as 1922 D&PL’s standard practice 
was to sell mechanically delinted seed.   Delta and Pine Land Co. of Mississippi, Salisbury Cotton, D&PL 
Records, Box 1, Oral History, D&PL archives. 
109 Cherry and Leffler, “Seed,” pp. 531-33. 
110 Hancock, “New Method,” pp. 1-2.  Accounts differ on the decline in planting seed per acre.  
Hancock notes savings of 20 percent, but Alexander notes that planting delinted cotton “utilizes less than 
one third the amount of seed needed for ordinary cotton production….” Alexander, Arkansas, p. 81.  
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acid and soak the seeds, noting the obvious: “Never add water to the acid, as this 
causes a violent reaction.”
111  For all the benefits, the cost of the acid and the 
unpleasantness of the task sharply limited the number of cotton farmers adopting the 
delinting technology.
112  But H. P. Smith saw the handwriting on the wall in 1950 when 
he noted that “most cotton growers plant regularly ginned seed which are covered with 
fuzzy lint.  Mechanization may be influencing the trend toward delinted seed.”
113  In the 
1960s with the development of improved acid technologies and with the advent of the 
mechanical cotton harvester, the acid processes began to compete more effectively with 
machine delinting.
114  In 1970 P. R. Smith estimated that roughly 95 percent of U.S. 
planting seed was delinted, with acid delinting accounting for 23 percent of the planting 
seed in California, about 90 percent in Texas and Arizona, 15 percent in the Mid South, 
and 40 to 50 percent in the Southeast.
115   
The adoption of delinting (and especially acid processes) reflects the interaction 
effects of mechanical and biological technologies as the diffusion of one reinforced the 
demand for the other.   It was in the interest of farmers to have ample labor during the 
peak season.  Thus, as an example, adopting tractors that would save labor in plowing 
would only exacerbate the imbalance between the peak and non-peak needs, potentially 
leading to labor shortages during the peak period.  Farmers who adopted a mechanical 
picker had an added incentive to reduce chopping labor requirements, and planting acid 
delinted seed made that possible.  Moreover, the new planting technologies made the 
mechanical picker much more efficient.  If plants are too widely spaced, they develop 
woody branches that hinder machine performance.  With delinted cotton and a 
mechanical seeder, farmers could achieve a thick, uniform stand suitable for efficient 
                                                 
111 Sherbakoff, Improved Method, p. 2. Bold type is in the original. 
112 Brown’s comment that “some authorities recommended delinting cotton seed that are to be used 
for planting purposes,” suggests the lack of adoption in 1938.  Brown, Cotton, 2
nd ed., p. 212.  In 1943, 
Alexander still asserted that delinting was relatively expensive. Alexander, Arkansas, p. 81.  In the mid-
1950s Christidis and Harrison still recommended machine rather than acid delinting.  They noted that the 
later processes were only “occasionally” used.  Christidis and Harrison, Cotton, pp. 310-11.   
113 Smith, “Cultural Practices,” p. 144. 
114 Elliot, Hoover, and Porter, Advances, pp. 125-26. 
115 Smith, “Introductory Remarks,” p. 90.  Smith claimed that 70 percent of the planting seed in 
Georgia was acid delinted.  Leaders in the development of the California cotton industry maintain that 
acid delinting came much earlier than Smith claimed.  In Arizona acid delinting appears to have been 
gaining wide favor as early as 1938, and at least one commercial delinting plant was in operation by that 
date.  “Much Delinted Seed,” p. 4.  Beginning in the 1938 the firm of Feffer-Wharton regularly advertised 
its acid-delinting services. Feffer-Wharton, March 1, 1938, p. 4 and March 15, 1938, p. 17.  By 1962, 90 
percent of D&PL seed sales in Arizona were acid delinted.  Sales Department Review, April 1962, Box 
19, D&PL archives.  
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machine operation, and eliminate most of the labor required for chopping.
116  The result 
was that whereas acid delinted seed was rare in 1950, it was gaining acceptance in the 
1960s, and nearly universal by the late 1970s.
117  
The new cottonseed delinting technologies offered significant economies of 
scale with the production of delinted seed typically concentrated in a few plants in any 
one state.
118  The adoption of delinted seed had enormous implications for the growth of 
the commercial cottonseed industry that were analogous to the implications of 
hybridization to seed-corn producers.  Corn farmers had to purchase new seed every 
year because pure-line F2 hybrids lost their vigor in a single generation.  But the 
improved cotton varieties were not F2 hybrids and thus farmers could recycle seeds, 
significantly reducing the demand for new commercial seeds.  But delinting 
dramatically increased the economic benefits of purchased seed relative to gin-run seed, 
stimulating farmers in most regions to buy seed annually.  This single technological 
change greatly reinforced the benefits that cottonseed companies received in 1970 with 
the passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act.   
Along with delinting came a number of other chemical treatments to control 
diseases and insects.  The upshot was that cottonseed in the 1960s not only was higher 
quality in terms of its yield potential than seeds of the 1930s, the modern seed embodied 
numerous other valuable technological features.  Thus by the late 1970s (at the time of 
Constantine, et al.’s estimates for California) a new division of labor had been firmly 
established.  In most regions nearly all farmers bought delinted certified seed nearly 
every year.  The old practice of planting one’s own seed obtained at the gin had become 
a rarity.  The new seeds were produced in tightly controlled isolated areas to help 
guarantee purity.  This change in seed technology, certification, and marketing, along 
with the development of superior varieties that effectively captured the market in whole 
                                                 
116 In addition the higher yields that came with improved seed and delinting directly stimulated the 
mechanization of the harvest by allowing the fixed cost of the machine to be spread over a larger volume 
of output.  Musoke and Olmstead, p. 402.   
117 In 1961 Waddle and Colwick noted that “delinting…is common throughout the Cotton Belt.   
Chemical delinting, mechanical delinting, and flame delinting are used.” Waddle and Colwick, 
“Producing Seeds,” p. 190.  Advances in chemical delinting technology included a dry system in which 
hydrochloric acid was mixed with sulfuric acid to form a gas that reacted with and crystallized the fuzz on 
the seed.  The seeds were then treated to remove the crystallized lint.  The various steps of the wet acid 
process were also integrated and mechanized in large delinting facilities.   
118 Around 1970 there were only four or five acid delinting plants in California, and only three in 
Mississippi.  In recent decades the production and delinting of planting seed for the entire South has 
largely moved to the arid west where weather conditions pretty much ensure that the seed will not get 
wet.  Many of the delinting operations have moved to Indian reservations, outside the reach of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  In addition, new technological advances in developing a foam 
delinting process have greatly reduced the negative environmental side effects.     
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regions or states, simply ended the need for formal one-variety communities.  It 
mattered little if seed was mixed at the gin if it was not intended for planting.  In 
addition, the problem of cross pollination in the field was minimized by the annual 
purchase of new seed, the de facto one-variety production, and the decades of 
insecticide use that reduced the density of insects.
119  The old production externalities 
that had haunted the industry were no longer an issue.  In addition the nearly universal 
use of Smith-Doxey classification services, and later the adoption of extremely accurate 
high volume electronic testing devices (HVI), largely solved the problems of classing 
cotton.  Thus, with the major exception of California, one-variety communities simply 
faded away, having served their purpose in helping promote the transition to better 




In 1957 James Street published his classic, The New Revolution in the Cotton 
Economy.  For Street the cotton revolution involved a wholesale transformation in 
cotton production — a transformation that was critical for the modernization of the 
southern economy.  But Street’s story of technological change focused largely on 
mechanization, with only occasional mention of cotton breeding and improvement 
activities, and then usually in the context of how breeders were assisting in the drive to 
develop plant qualities conducive to mechanizing the harvest.
120   The message of this 
paper is to emphasize the importance of the other revolution in the cotton economy.  
Biological and structural rather than mechanical, this revolution led to a fundamental 
change in the source of seed supply, in the varieties of cotton grown, and how cotton 
was classed and marketed.  One of America’s leading cotton breeders, J. Winston Neely 
offered a perspective of recent accomplishments as of the late 1950s:  
…the progress made by cotton breeders is truly phenomenal.  Yields have been 
markedly increased.  Varietal resistance to diseases, resulting from breeding programs, 
has made profitable the growing of crops where non-resistant varieties would fail 
completely.  The quality of fiber produced by improved varieties has been greatly 
                                                 
119 Yet a final factor in the demise of one-variety communities was the development of High Velocity 
Instruments that could rapidly and accurately quantify the important characteristics of cotton samples, and 
the increased ability of mills to handle less uniform cotton.  These innovations reduced the premium to 
uniform production. 
120 For example, see Street, New Revolution, pp. 112-13 and 147-48.  Street’s emphasis is consistent 
with the broader treatment of technological change in agriculture.  As an example Peter McClelland’s 
recent book Sowing Modernity has a chapter on sowing that offers marvelous detail on the machines that 
sowed the seeds, but almost no mention of the changing qualities of the seeds fed into the machines.  
McClelland, Sowing Modernity, pp. 64-93.  
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increased.  Characteristics of plant type, growth habit and fiber quality of many 
varieties have been altered by breeding, to the extent that they are much better adapted 
to cheaper and better methods of planting, culture, harvesting and processing.  We 




These changes, rather than the arrival of the mechanical picker, accounted for 
the roughly tripling of American cotton yields and the increases in average staple length 
between 1930 and 1960.
122  As Neely  noted, the new biological technologies interacted 
with mechanical technologies reinforcing the drive to increase southern agricultural 
productivity.  Because of these interaction effects with mechanical technologies, the 
new biological systems had a far greater effect in reducing labor demand than analogous 
biological innovations in the grain sectors. 
But what fundamentally separated the biological revolution in cotton from what 
transpired in corn and most other crops was the greater role that the USDA played in 
orchestrating institutional innovations.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
USDA research programs played a key role in improving the quality of seed supplies of 
most major crops.  USDA scientists searched the globe for useful varieties, and 
government breeding, testing, and outreach programs made an enormous contribution to 
help transform the seed supplies available to American farmers.
123  In addition, the 
USDA focused on improving the efficiency of seed markets.  Seed embodies a complex 
array of technical characteristics that are difficult for an individual farmer to assess.  
Evaluations about the relative performance of different varieties and the quality of a 
given batch of seed (was it cleaned and stored properly, etc.) usually must wait until the 
harvest; and given annual variations in growing conditions, several years may be 
required to make a reliable assessment.  As a result, the development of a market in seed 
requires particularly good information and mechanisms for providing guarantees to 
farmers and building trust between seed buyers and sellers.
124  For most crops, the 
USDA (often following the lead of individual states) helped to develop national 
procedures, laws, and agencies for testing and certifying the genetic and physical 
characteristics of seed.  But in the case of cotton, the task of market development was 
 
                                                 
121 Neely, “Cotton,” p. 74. 
122 As with corn, other factors such as the application of improved fertilizers, herbicides, and 
insecticides clearly contributed to cotton yield increases.   
123 Olmstead and Rhode, “Red Queen.” 
124 Tripp, “Institutional Conditions,” p. 24.  
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complicated by the exceptional problems in maintaining pure seed supplies, and the 
failure of the system of local cotton classing to reflect the relative premiums and 
discounts prevailing in central markets.  These problems combined with the relative 
lack of education and the more depressed conditions in the Cotton South created 
formidable barriers to technological diffusion which in turn dampened the incentive for 
private breeders to invest in creating improved cotton varieties.    
The one-variety community movement and Smith-Doxey classification system 
represented the vehicles for a comprehensive reform program that included educational 
campaigns and seed certification systems.  The goal was to fundamentally redesign both 
the production and marketing of cotton in order to shock the cotton economy out of the 
prevailing low-productivity equilibrium.
125  Within a few years of the beginning of 
these efforts local reports were touting improved yields, longer staple length, and 
greater price premiums.  By the late 1940s over 400,000 cotton farmers, producing 
roughly 60 percent of American cotton output, were in one-variety communities.   
Institutional and technological changes, along with the development of private sector 
seed companies, gradually eroded the advantages of one-variety systems.  In the South 
they simply faded away.  In California, the one-variety law and institutions were harder 
to dispose of, and the system persisted into the 1990s, long after it evidently had 
become obsolete. 
 
                                                 
125 It is important to note that the problems of maintaining pure seed supplies and of grading cotton 
were not unique to American growers, and that other countries, including Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, and 





Table 1: Average Staple Lengths  (in 32ds of an inch) 
 1880 1913 1928-30 
Alabama 32.9 29.8 28.4 
Arizona     32.8 
Arkansas 33.2 30.4 31.2 
California     33.8 
Florida     28.8 
Georgia 34.1 30.6 29.0 
Louisiana 34.2 31.4 31.0 
Mississippi 33.5 31.4 32.8 
Missouri     31.0 
New Mexico      33.5 
North Carolina  33.9 29.3 29.7 
Oklahoma   32.6 29.7 
South Carolina  39.5 29.8 30.4 
Tennessee     29.9 
Texas 34.4 31.4 30.0 
Virginia     29.2 
Other     33.7 
United States  34.3 30.8 30.3 
     
Sources: Compiled from Hilgard, Report; Taylor, Relation;  
and U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Grade, pp. 20-21.






Table 2: Average Price Differential between 34 and 28 Staple Cottons, 1928-36
                (in cents per pounds) 
     
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Local  Central  Ratio 
Season  Markets Markets (1)/(2)   
Panel 1     
1928  0.45 1.65 0.27 
1929  0.37 1.98 0.19 
1930  0.18 1.55 0.12 
1931  0.23 1.03 0.22 
1932 0.12  0.8  0.15 
     
Panel  2     
Market     
w/o  PCS     
1933 0.16  1  0.16 
1934  0.82 1.48 0.55 
1935 0.21  --  -- 
1936 0.58  --  -- 
     
w/  PCS     
1933  0.21 0.47 0.45 
1934  0.38 1.33 0.29 
1935  0.54 0.95 0.57 
1936  0.84 1.52 0.55 
     
PCS = Public Classification System 
     
     








Table 3: Cotton in One-Variety Communities, 1934-49 
               
   Counties        Production of adopted varieties 
   Participating Communities Grower  Acres  Bales 
Year Number  Percent  Participating Members  Number Percent Number  Percent 
            (thousand)  (thousand)  %  (thousand)  % 
1934             589    2    nd  nd 
1935  161  19     331             nd     788    3     571   5 
1936  234  28     511             nd  1,470    5  1,112   9 
1937  312  38     730             nd  2,453    7  1,883  10 
1938  425  33  1,056             nd  2,284    9  1,445  12 
1939  495  62  1,516            132   2,987  12  1,656  14 
1940  548  70  1,922            185   4,518  18  2,742  22 
1941  550  71  2,116            229   6,239  27  3,367  32 
1942  577  75  2,564            292   7,614  33  4,570  37 
1943  549  77  2,544            306   8,869  40  4,771  43 
1944  581  80  2,194            299   7,226  36  4,762  39 
1945  500  72  1,800            319   7,071  40  4,172  45 
1946  485  70  1,601            310   6,808  39  4,350  50 
1947  nd  nd  1,963            331  8,537  40  5,659  48 
1948  531  77  2,275            353   11,549  50  9,511  64 
1949  546  79  2,422            426   13,500  49  9,500  59 
 
Sources:  Compiled from U.S. Congress, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2, October 10, 1947; 
USDA  Report of the Administrator, 1948, p. 319; Brown and Ware, Cotton, p. 58; U.S. Congress, 
Research, 81
st Cong., 2
nd Sess., December 21, 1950, p. 753; USDA, Report of Cooperative Extension 









Table 4: Cotton growing in standardized one-variety communities    
State Totals for 1946             
                
      Production of adopted varieties 
 
Counties 
Participating Communities Grower  Acres    Bales  
State Number Percent  Participating Members Number Percent Number Percent
         (thousand) %  (thousand)  % 
                
Alabama  53    83  263      39,225          610     40  386    48 
Arizona    6  100      9           954          151   100  143  100 
Arkansas  30    57  229      10,788          580     36  546    44 
California    7  100      7        5,509          339   100  435  100 
Georgia  84    81  241      38,417          574     47  315    57 
Kentucky    2    67      2           496             10     97      8    97 
Louisiana  26    70    29      22,238          404     51  133    53 
Mississippi  61    81  185      49,605          867     38  410    37 
Missouri    8  100  126        7,654          272     89  272    89 
New Mexico    5  100      5        4,117          130     98  145    98 
North Carolina  33    69    38      27,800          332     58  259    62 
Oklahoma  29    59    51      13,871          271     27    78    30 
South Carolina  26    62    30      26,554          421     46  329    47 
Tennessee  22    79    29      26,898          345     57  291    57 
Texas  91    57  354      35,955       1,499     25  508    36 
Virginia    2    33      3           265              3     13      1      9 
                
Source: U.S. Congress, Hearings, 80
th Cong., 1







Table 5: Farmer Participation in the Smith-Doxey Cotton Grading Program 
          
  Cotton Improvement Groups  Samples   Share of  
Crop       Classed  US  Cotton 
Year  Number  Members     (1000 bales)  Production 
1938     312    18,589           84    0.7 
1939     918    64,399         265    2.3 
1940  1,573  128,216      1,531  12.4 
1941  2,511  278,782      2,520  24.0 
1942  2,465  281,100      3,567  28.7 
1943  2,459  281,493      3,337  30.1 
1944  2,410  321,284      4,037  34.4 
1945  2,444  343,000      2,888  33.0 
1946  2,515  343,700      2,574  30.3 
1947  2,453  346,500      4,300  37.3 
1948  --  371,061      8,067  55.3 
1949 --  497,064    10,456  65.1 
1950  --  507,873      5,215  53.2 
1951  --  495,391      9,844  65.3 
1952  --  515,711      9,382  62.0 
1953 --  --    12,700  77.0 
1954 --  --    --  -- 
1955 --  --    --  81.0 
1956 --  551,077    11,200  85.0 
1957 --  --    --  -- 
1958 --  --    --  93.0 
1959 --  --    --  95.0 
1960 --  --    --  96.0 
1961 --  699,632    13,703  96.0 
1962 --  691,670    13,510  91.0 
1963 --  678,749    14,016  92.0 
1964 --  --    --  -- 
1965 --  --    14,311  96.0 
          
Sources: Betts, “Green Card,” pp. 13-16; U.S. Office of Marketing Services, Report, 1942/43, p. 
111; 1943/44, pp. 44-47; 1944/45, pp. 20-24; USDA, Report of the Administrator of the 
Production and Marketing Admin., 1946, p. 36; 1947 pp. 33-34; 1948, p. 39; 1950, pp. 11-14; 
1951 p, 13; 1952, pp. 19-20; 1953, p. 11; USDA, Report of the Secretary, 1956, p. 35; 1957, p. 
39; 1959, p. 41; 1960, p. 41; 1961, p. 41; 1962, p. 41; 1966, p. 90; U.S. Congress, Agricultural 
Department Appropriation Bill for 1954, p.1734; 1955, pp.1031; 1963, p.1249; 1964, p.1344; 







Table 6: Cotton Variety Concentration by State in 1954 
        
  Percent of Acreage Planted To:   
        
  One Variety    Two Varieties  
State (percent)    (percent)   
        
Alabama   37    68   
Arizona   81    86   
Arkansas   62    77   
Georgia   60    80   
Illinois   72    90   
Kentucky   83    98   
Louisiana   84    89   
Mississippi   76    82   
Missouri   40    70   
Nevada          100             100   
New Mexico   57    66   
North Carolina   98    99   
Oklahoma   26    46   
South Carolina   95    97   
Tennessee   57    78   
Texas   11    21   
Virginia   95    96   
        







Table 7: Acreage and Production of Certified Cotton Seed, 1940-57 
                
                
  Acres Approved for Certification  Certified Cotton Seed Production 
  (Thousands of Acres)    (Thousands of Tons)   
                
Year Foundation  Registered  Certified  Total   Foundation  Registered  Certified  Total
1940       98.0         
1945       296.0         
1946       297.7        70.4
1947       436.5        94.5
1948       506.3        129.4
1949       558.9        49.1
1950 10.4  169.1  271.0  450.5  2.9  34.1  70.1  107.1
1951 6.5  225.9  406.9  639.3  1.4  44.5  95.7  141.6
1952 9.5  277.4  414.6  701.5  2.8  76.2  104.2  183.2
1953 7.7  216.0  343.4  567.1  2.5  80.7  89.2  172.5
1954 4.9  183.7  272.9  461.4  1.4  58.5  85.5  145.4
1955 8.4  62.5  294.3  365.2  3.1  21.7  98.9  123.6
1956 6.9  120.9  246.3  374.1  2.4  34.0  61.6  98.0
1957 7.5  94.4  201.8  303.7  3.3  23.7  83.1  110.1
                
Sources: Hackleman and Scott, History, Appendix 1, p. 53; Fisher, Report, 1946 and 1947; 
Beeson, Report, 1948, 1949, 1950; Saunders, Report, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956; Hill, 
Report, 1957, 1958.  
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